IS NUCLEAR GROWTH COMPATIBLE WITH NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES?
Mr John Carlson,
Director General Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
Engineering House, Milson’s Point 3 November 2004
Nuclear power was estimated to increase by up to three-fold by 2050, with much of this increase in the Asia-Pacific Region. The question was posed: will this have an increased impact on the non-proliferation regime, especially if there is increasing recycle of plutonium due to an increase in the price of uranium.
Mr Carlson then discussed the record of non-proliferation to date, current and prospective developments and ways in which proliferation concerns can be addressed. In the 1960's it was forecast that there might be 25 nuclear-armed states by 2000, but today there are only 5 nuclear weapon states, and 4 nuclear-capable states (India, Israel, Pakistan and N. Korea). Only three states have violated the NPT (N. Korea, Iraq and Libya).
Most concern at present is in the wider development of the sensitive technologies of uranium enrichment and reprocessing by countries which do not currently possess nuclear weapons. The Khan case was a salutory reminder of how sensitive technology can be disseminated and almost certainly was to Pakistan, Libya, Iran and N. Korea.
It was suggested that more proliferation-resistant technologies needed to be developed and implemented,eg: the once-through cycle to minimise the amount of separated Pu, direct use of Pu in PWRs like CANDU, co-processing FBR blankets if FBRs become established, use of thorium fuel, eg. with 20% LEU and thorium, spiking fuel with 2% of the Pu-238 isotope to render it unusable in a weapon. Some of these may be feasible, but all need development.
Mr Carlson referred to previous studies such as the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation carried out by the IAEA and many countries in 1979-1982, and in which Australia took an active part. This study reviewed a very large number of alternatives for nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle. Many of these (old) ideas are being reconsidered, for example, the concept of international nuclear fuel cycle centres.
Meanwhile, Mr Carlson believes it is important to strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime further, even though it has proved to be very successful for the last 40 years. His final conclusion was that a strong effective non-proliferation regime and credible safeguards are essential for there to be public confidence in an increase in nuclear power.
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